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In the first stage, we estimate a non-parametric hedonic home price function. Second, we recover
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Housing accounts for a major fraction of consumer spending and wealth. Shelter is the largest of the seven
categories that comprise the CPI market basket, accounting for 32 percent of the total index. Housing
equity represents the largest source of household wealth. Based on the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances,
the value of stocks owned by households was 7.8 trillion while the value of primary residences was 9.4
trillion. About two-thirds of American households own their homes while less than half of households own
stocks. The majority of those who own both stocks and a home still have more wealth in home equity than
in stocks (Di 2001).
In this paper, we study housing demand by applying a three-step procedure for estimating the demand
for differentiated products described in Bajari and Benkard (2002). First, we estimate a hedonic house
price function using a non-parametric technique based on the local polynomial methods described in Fan
and Gijbels (1996). Second, we infer household speciﬁc preference parameters for continuous product
characteristics using a ﬁrst order condition for utility maximization. Finally, we model individual speciﬁc
taste coefﬁcients as a function of household demographics and household speciﬁc preference shocks. The
methodsthat weproposearecomputationallystraightforwardandcanbeestimatedusingstandardstatistical
packages.
This approach has a number of novel features that differ from existing studies of housing demand such
as Palmquist (1984), Coulson and Bond (1990), Cheshire and Sheppard (1998), Epple and Sieg (1999) and
Bayer, McMillan and Ruben (2002). First, the recent literature on discrete choice models emphasizes the
importance of accounting for product characteristics observed by the consumer but not by the economist.
Ignoring such attributes biases estimated price elasticities towards zero. See, for instance, Berry (1994),
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Petrin (2002) and Ackerberg and Rysman (2002). In our analysis, we
derive preferencesfor both observedand unobservedproduct characteristics. Second, our model has a ﬂex-
ible speciﬁcation of consumer preferences. We use random coefﬁcients and household level demographics
2to model taste heterogeneity. In most previous models with random coefﬁcients, such as Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes(1995) and McCollough, Polson and Rossi (2000), the random coefﬁcients are typically assumed
to be independently and normally distributed conditional on household demographics. In our analysis, we
recover a non-parametric distribution of the random coefﬁcients for continuous characteristics, and we only
imposeparametric assumptionsfor discreteproductcharacteristicssincetheyare requiredfor identiﬁcation.
Finally, the methods that we propose allow for both discrete and continuous product characteristics.
Asanapplicationof ourmethods,weexplorewhytheaveragewhitehouseholdlivesinthesuburbswhile
the averageblack householdlives in the center city. We estimate our housingdemand model for a sample of
white and black migrants in three major cities to explore the merits of three potential explanations. The ﬁrst
hypothesisis that whites and blackshavedifferent demandsfor the physicalattributes of housing. Suburban
homes are larger, newer and more likely to be single detached owner occupied units relative to center city
housing units. Blacks may have a lower demand for such products because their household incomes are
lower thanwhites. Thesecondhypothesisis that racial segregationis inextricablytied to local labor markets
and the disutility from commuting. If minority employment is disproportionately located in center cities
and if the disutility from commuting is high, then blacks will urbanize.2 The ﬁnal hypothesis focuses on
peer group selection. Communities differ with respect to their racial composition and their human capital
levels. A household will recognize that by choosing a particular community it will determine who will
be their neighbors and who their children will go to school with. The average suburban community has
more college graduates and fewer minorities than the average urban community. Blacks and whites may
differ with respect to their willingness to pay for these attributes. Estimates of willingness to pay for peers
provides an alternative approach for recovering peer effects than the more standard “production function”
approach as exempliﬁed by Case and Katz (1991) and Crane (1991).
Manski (1993) has argued that a “production function” based approach for measuring peer effects of-
ten suffers from a reﬂection problem. By regressing a variable on its average, the peer group effect is not
identiﬁed. Since we focus on estimating willingness to pay, if the hedonic price coefﬁcients can be con-
sistently estimated, then the preferences for peer groups can be identiﬁed from revealed preference under
2 We recognize that another hypothesis is that black households seeking suburban housing products are discriminated
against (Yinger1986, Munnell et. al. 1996). Detecting and accounting forperceived or actualdiscrimination isbeyond the scope
of this paper (Heckman 1998).
3our modeling assumptions. While consistently estimating implicit prices from hedonic coefﬁcients can be
difﬁcult, the most important problem in practice is limited data and not a fundamental lack of identiﬁcation
as in Manski (1993).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our micro data. The available information
plays a key role in determining our modeling strategy. In Section 3, we present the three step structural
housing demand model. In Section 4, we present details about the model and we thoroughly contrast our
approach with recent methods used to estimate the demand for differentiated products. In Section 5, we
present our empirical application and in Section 6 we conclude.
2 Data.
The micro data in our empirical application comes from the 1990 Census of Population and Housing Inte-
grated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) 1% unweighted sample. We study housing demand in three
major metropolitan areas: Atlanta, Chicago, and Dallas.3 Based on the Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999)
1990 disimilarity index, Chicago is highly segregated, while Dallas features a low segregation score and
Atlanta is in the middle of the distribution. We have intentionally chosen to not include high priced cities
such as Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco because home prices are top coded in the Census data.
The units for all dollar amounts in this paper are 1989 pre-tax dollars.
The Census data provides rich information on a household’s demographic characteristics. For each
member of the household roster, the Census reports age, race, education, employment status, income, place
of residence and place of work. The household’s owner or renter status is given. In addition, the Census
publishes detailed housing unit characteristics such as the unit’s age, number of rooms and whether the unit
is single detached or part of a multi-unit building. Home prices and rents are self-reported. Following the
convention in the urban literature, we deﬁne annual housing expenditure for owners as the reported home
price multiplied by 7.5% (see Gyourko and Tracy 1991).
Inthedata,theplaceofresidenceidentiﬁersarePublicUseMicroAreas(PUMAs). PUMAsareintended
to be similar areascontaining 100,000people or more. While PUMAs generally are aggregationsof census
tracts and urban places, they do not reﬂect the boundaries of political jurisdictions. The data set also
3 The Chicago metropolitan area consists of Chicago-Gary Lake, Aurora Elgin Gary-Hammond, East Chicago, Joliet, Illinois
Lake County. Atlanta isthe Atlanta PMSA and Dallas consists of Dallas/Ft-Worth, Ft-Worth, and Arlington, Texas.
4includes place of work identiﬁers that are more spatially aggregated than PUMA identiﬁers. We create
measuresof communitycharacteristicsbycalculatingPUMA speciﬁcmeanssuchas acommunity’spercent
of college graduates and percent of black households.
We focus on the housing choices of black and white migrant households. Migration status is determined
by whether the household head lived in a different home in 1990 than in 1985. Unlike recent migrants,
households who do not move may not be consuming their optimal housing bundle due to the transactions
costs of moving. This makes it difﬁcult to infer the preferences of non-movers from their current bundle.
3 A Model of Housing Choice.
In this section, we describe a method for estimating housing demand which builds on the techniques pro-
posedin Bajari and Benkard (2002). In the model, there are
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Equation (5) is the familiar condition that the marginal rate of substitution between a continuous character-
istic and the composite commodity is equal to the partial derivative of the hedonic.
In the theory of revealed preference, if one observes a household’s choices under all possible budget
sets, then it is possible to recover the entire weak preference relation for that household under well known
regularity conditions (see Mas-Colell (1977)). In the Census data, however, a single cross section of
households is observed, and therefore global identiﬁcation of preferences is not possible. From equation
(5), it is clear that household preferences will only be identiﬁed locally. Therefore, we use the following
speciﬁcation for consumer preferences:
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In the parametric model (6)-(8), each household
i has a unique set of taste parameters
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8 for the
product characteristics. Since utility functions are identiﬁed only up to monotonictransformations, without
loss of generality, we normalize the coefﬁcient on the composite commodity to one.
If we make the functional form assumption (6), equation (4) becomes
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Using equation (10), we note that
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That is, if household
i lives in single detached housing we can infer that
i’s preference parameter exceeds
the implicit price for this characteristic. Analogous conditions can be derived for the other discrete charac-
teristics.
4 Estimation.
Our approach to estimation involves three steps. In the ﬁrst step, we estimate the housing hedonic using
ﬂexible, non-parametric methods based on the techniques described in Fan and Gijbels (1996). Second,
we use the ﬁrst order condition (10) to infer household level preference parameters for continuous product
characteristics. Third, we estimate (7) and (8) by regressing household level preference parameters on the
demographic characteristics
d
i. We also discuss how to estimate preferences for discrete characteristics by
maximum likelihood.
4.1 First Step: Estimating the Hedonic.
We have experimented with several different methods for estimating the hedonic, including high order
polynomials and kernel regression. The method that produced the most appealing estimates are based on
local polynomial modeling. To estimate the implicit prices faced by household
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In equation (13) and (14),
p is the vector of all prices for all products
j in a given metropolitan area,
X
is a vector of regressors, which for each product includes an intercept and eight characteristics and
W is
a matrix of kernel weights. Notice that the kernel weights are a function of the distance between product
j
￿ and product
j. Thus, the local linear regression assigns greater importance to observations near
j
￿.
Local linear methods have the same asymptotic variance and a lower asymptotic bias than the Nadaraya-
Watsonestimator. Also, theGasser-Muellerestimatorhasthesameasymptoticbiasandahigherasymptotic
variance than local linear methods.
Our estimates of equation (13) and (14) allow us to recover an estimate of the unobserved product
characteristic
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In equation (15), the unobserved product characteristic
￿
j
￿ is estimated as the residual to our hedonic re-
gression. While there are certainly other interpretations of the hedonic residual, we believe that this in-
terpretation is the most important in our data. Given the lack of appropriate instruments, we maintain the
standard hedonic assumption that the unobserved product characteristics are independent of the observed
product characteristics.
In local linear regressions, the choice of kernel and bandwidth is extremely important. We chose the
following normal kernel function with a bandwidth of 3
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In equation (16), the function
K is a product of standard normal distributions which we denote using
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9is the sample standard deviation of characteristic
k.4 Fan and Gijbels (1996) describe asymptotically
appropriatemethodsfor choosingthebandwidth. However,inour application,sincethehedonicsdependon
8 covariates such asymptotic approximations are not likely to be very reliable. Based on visual inspection
of the estimates, we choose the bandwidth equal to 3.
Giventhelargenumberofcovariates,weshouldnotinterpret theseestimatesas“non-parametric”. How-
ever, compared to other ﬂexible functional forms, local linear methods appeared to give much more plausi-
ble estimatesof the implicit prices. In all threecities, the estimatedimplicit prices haveintuitively plausible
signs and magnitudes.
4.2 Second Step: Applying the First Order Conditions.
After estimating the implicit prices, we next estimate the preferences for continuous characteristics. If
household
i chooses product
j
￿, equation (10) must hold. The left hand side of equation (10) is the
agent’s unobserved preference parameter. The right hand side depends only on
x
j
￿
;
k, agent
i’s choice of
the continuous characteristic
k and the implicit price of characteristic
k faced by agent
i in the market.
Using estimates of implicit prices obtained from the ﬁrst step and the observed choice of
x
j
￿
;
k,
￿
i
;
k can
be recovered. Since the preference parameter for every individual can be recovered using our ﬁrst order
condition, the population distribution of tastes can be estimated. In the next step, we describe how to
estimate the joint distribution of tastes and demographics.
4.3 Third Step: Modeling the Joint Distribution of Tastes and Demographics.
After household level preference parameters are recovered, we then estimate (7)-(8). We could easily do
this using very ﬂexible methods as in our estimates of the hedonic. However, for presentation purposes, it
is more convenient to model the joint distribution of tastes and demographic characteristics using a linear
regression model.
Equation (11) and (12) demonstrate that preference parameters for discrete characteristics are not iden-
tiﬁed. In what follows, we shall assume that
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k is normally distributed with a mean that depends on
demographic characteristics and an unknown variance. If a household
i chooses to live in a detached unit,
4 We need to normalize the units of the different characteristics in equation (16). Otherwise, age, which
takes on values from 1 to70 would have amuch greaterinﬂuence on theweights than thepercentage of college educated heads of
households in the PUMA, which only takes on values from 0 to 1.
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The likelihood function for the population distribution of tastes for single detached housing can be written
as
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where in equation (21),
s
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e
j
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(
i
) is an indicator variable that is equal to one if household
i purchases
single detached housing and zero otherwise. We estimate the model above using maximum likelihood. In
principal, we could model correlation between the taste coefﬁcients for all discrete product characteristics
using a multivariate normal distribution and estimate a more ﬂexible model of how tastes for characteristics
are correlated. However, for expositional clarity, we estimate the tastes for each product characteristic
independently. An alternative approach, which does not require assuming that tastes lie in a parametric
family, is to use the bounds approach described in Bajari and Benkard (2002).
4.4 Discussion.
Since the methods we are employing are somewhat unique, it is useful to compare our approach to methods
that havebeenusedto estimatethe demandfor housingattributes andthe demandfor differentiatedproducts
11more generally. First, the recent literature on estimating discrete choice models has emphasized that price
elasticities tend to be biased towards zero if the economist fails to account for
￿
j, product characteristics
that are observed by the consumer but not by the economist. See, for instance, Berry (1994), Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Petrin (2002) and Ackerberg and Rysman (2002). This problem is ignored in
most previous studies of housing demand.5 We expect this problem to be especially important in housing
research based on standard Census data where researchers commonly ﬁnd that the observed covariates
explain half or less of the variation in prices.
Second, our model allows for a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the joint distribution of tastes and demographic
characteristics. In our model, we estimate the distribution of 9 random coefﬁcients, 8 random coefﬁcients
for the observed product characteristics and one for unobserved product characteristics, as a function of 8
demographic variables. The random coefﬁcients in our model can easily be estimated non-parametrically,
except in the case of discrete product characteristics where we impose functional form assumptions for
identiﬁcation. In most previous papers that estimate discrete choice models, such as Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995) or McCollough, Poulson and Rossi (2000), the random coefﬁcients are typically assumed
to be independently and normally distributed, conditional on demographics. Given that these models
are computationally intensive, a parsimonious parametric speciﬁcation is often needed. By contrast, our
procedure is extremely easy to compute and can be quickly estimated using standard statistical packages.
The analyst does face a couple of trade-offs, however, in using our approach as compared to the random
coefﬁcient logit model estimated by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) or the random coefﬁcient probit
estimated by McCollough, Poulson and Rossi (2000 ). The ﬁrst is that in characteristic models such
as ours, not all product are strong gross substitutes. The number of products with positive cross price
elasticities is proportional to the number of characteristics used in the analysis. (See Anderson, DePalma
and Thisse (1995) for a complete discussion.) In our example, since there are 8 product characteristics,
we do not believe that this is particularly problematic, however, it can be an issue in data sets with fewer
product characteristics. Second, the instrumental variable strategies proposed by Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes (1995) cannot be implemented in our model in a straightforward fashion.
Third, while our approach to estimating preferences is similar to the hedonic two-step of Rosen (1974)
5 An important exception is Bayer, McMillan and Ruben (2002).
12and Epple (1987), there are some important distinctions. In our model, household level preferences are
only locally identiﬁed from a single cross section of data. While we do regress preferences on household
level demographics to obtain an estimate of how preferences change with demographic characteristics of
the household, we do not attempt to globally estimate preferences as in the standard second stage hedonic
regression. As a result, our procedure does not involve a step that requires the economist to regress product
characteristics on non-linear functions of product characteristics, which has been criticized as a limitation
of secondstage(Brown andRosen1982). Epple(1987) presentsa formal model of the necessaryconditions
for achievingidentiﬁcationofstructural parametersusingthehedonictwo step. Findingvalidinstrumentsto
implement this procedureis often quite challenging. Hedonicresearchershaveinsteadattempted alternative
identiﬁcation strategies such as pooling multiple segmented markets at a point in time and arguing that
differences in equilibrium prices and quantities across markets reﬂect differences in supply conditions, and
this variation traces out “the” demand curve (Palmquist 1984).
Our paperis probablymostcloselyrelated tothe important recentcontributionsofEppleandSieg(1999)
and Bayer, McMillan and Ruben (2002). Our approach differs from Epple and Sieg (1999) in that we do
not use a vertical model of product differentiation (see Bresnahan 1987). A limitation of our approach
compared to their research, however, is that we do not exploit market clearing conditions in our analysis
and that we do not present an equilibrium model of the entire housing market which could be used to
compute interesting policy counterfactuals. Bayer, McMillan and Ruben (2002) apply techniques similar
to Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) to estimate a model of housing demand using a rich data set from
the San Francisco Bay Area. Unlike Bayer, McMillan and Ruben (2002), we only impose parametric
assumptionson the random coefﬁcientsin our model when they are required for identiﬁcation. A weakness
of our analysis, compared to this paper is that Bayer, McMillan and Ruben (2002) have a richer data set
on community characteristics. We attempt to compensate for this limitation of our data by checking the
robustness of our results on data from multiple cities.
Finally, one appealingfeature of our analysisis that it is verytransparent. Hedonicsis a well understood
and popular technique in housing research. It makes clear, using simple econometric methods, exactly
what needs to be assumed about the joint distribution of observed and unobservedproduct characteristics in
order to correctly calculate the implicit prices. Then, from the hedonics, we simply use the implicit prices
13to engage in revealed preference.
There are at least three limitations to the model of housing demand presented in the previous section.
The ﬁrst is the standard exogeneity assumptions employed in hedonics. In general, one would not expect
unobserved product characteristics to be independent of observed product characteristics. In our opinion,
biasesin implicit prices are primarily a data issue. With sufﬁcientlydetailed data, onecan recoverplausible
estimates of implicit prices. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no publicly available data
sources in which we can merge the detailed demographic data used in the census with detailed data on
home prices and characteristics. To address this problem, we checked our estimates of implicit prices
against those found by other researchers to make sure that they appeared reasonable. This problem is
not unique to hedonics, as most discrete choice models similarly assume that product characteristics are
exogenous.
Second, the results of our analysis will depend to some extent on the functional form of the utility
function. Given that we only have a single cross section of data, it is not possible to globally identify
preferences. We note, however, that we impose the minimal functional form assumptions that are required
for identiﬁcation. Also, many of the results that we present will be based on the willingness to pay for
fairly small changes in the bundle consumed by a household. Since the marginal rate of substitution for
continuouscharacteristicsisidentiﬁedwithout functionalform assumptions,manyofourresultswill remain
robust for a large set of alternative speciﬁcations for preferences.
Third, we recognize that observed differences in mean willingness to pay for housing attributes be-
tween whites and blacks may represent other factors than “preferences”. While we control for household
head educational attainment and household income, race may still proxy for permanent income and wealth
accumulation (see Duca and Rosenthal 1994). Despite the limitations of this exercise, we believe that ﬂex-
ibly modeling the joint distribution of tastes and demographic characteristics is an important step in better
understanding the determinants of housing demand.
5 Results.
Our empirical application focuses on the housing choices of migrants ages 18-60 who work and commute
by private vehicle to work. In all three cities, the average black and white migrant head of household both
14works and commutes by private vehicle to work. Our sample restriction allows us to focus on the housing
demands of middle class households independent of job search concerns. The unemployed and those not
working in the legal work force may choose a residential community because of the expected economic
opportunities from living there. Since it is quite difﬁcult to measure the accessibility of public transit by
community, and we do not want to jointly model the choice of commuting mode and choosing a housing
product, we focus solely on private vehicle commuters.6
Table 1 provides some basic summary statistics concerning white and black migrants in our sample. In
each city, we compare migrants to all household heads who work, who are 18-60 who commute by car to
work. A large share of the household heads move over a ﬁve year period. In Chicago, 54% of all whites
switched homes between 1985 and 1990 while for blacks 46% migrated. Migrants are better educated but
have lower household incomes than the entire population. Across the three cities, both black and white
migrants are more likely to rent their home, and live in a smaller housing unit. In all three cities, black
migrants are more likely to live in the suburbs than the average black household.
To ease the computational burdens in estimating the ﬂexible hedonic speciﬁcation, a random sample of
2000 migrants was drawn for each city. These three samples of 2000 observations each will form the basis
for all of the subsequent empirical work.7 Table 2 presents the sample demographic means for white and
black migrants included in our structural estimates across the three metropolitan areas. Across the three
cities, the average white household’s income is $15,000 higher than the average black’s household. White
householdheadsare much more likely to be married than black householdheads. This marriage differential
is 14 percentage points in Atlanta, 20 percentage points in Chicago and 17 percentage points in Dallas.
Averaged acrossthe three cities, white householdheads are 18 percentage points more likely to be a college
graduate than black household heads.
5.1 Hypothesis #1 The Demand for Physical Housing Attributes and Housing Type
This section tests the hypothesis that whites are moving to the suburbs because they have a greater demand
for larger, newerhousing units. The suburbanhousingstock features homesthat are larger, newer, and more
6 Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport (2000) report evidence that access to public transit is a major urbanizing force for
households in poverty. In this paper, we are focusing on people who work and almost all people who work
have income above the poverty line.
7 In our local linear regressions, however, we use all of the households in the sample to estimate the implicit
prices in equations (13) and (14).
15likely to be single detached relative to the center city housing stock. The standard explanation for this fact
is that the housing stock is durable and land’s price per square foot falls with distance from the Central
Business District to compensate for the longer commute downtown (Alonso 1964). We test whether whites
and blacks have different tastes for such attributes and whether average demographic differences between
races such as differences in income, educational attainment and marriage rates explains differences in the
demand for physical attributes of the housing unit.
Reduced form evidence documents the differences in housing consumption across demographic groups
for the migrant samples. InTable3, wepresentOLSregressionresultsfrom 21 separateregressions. In each
regression, we control for the household income and household size, and the household head’s education,
race, age, sex and marital status. The top panel of the Table reports results for Atlanta. Column (6) reports
the regression where the dependent variable is the housing unit’s number of rooms. We ﬁnd that married
households live in homes that have .68 more rooms in Atlanta and .7 more rooms in Chicago than non-
married households. Across the three cities, married migrants are over 20 percentage points more likely
to own a home and to live in a single detached suburban home. An extra $10,000 in household income
increases the propensity to own a home by 3 percentage points in each of the cities.
For each city, we estimate the structural model presented in Section 3. This yields for each housing
attribute, a preference parameter for each migrant. The discrete choice literature has modeled such random
coefﬁcientsasnormally distributed. In FigureOne,we presentahistogramof thetasteparametersfor rooms
for the 2000 Chicago migrants. The important point conveyed by this ﬁgure is that tastes are right skewed
and are not normally distributed. Tastes are also correlated across product attributes. Table 4 reports, by
city, the correlation matrix of tastes across attributes. Across all three cities, the taste for rooms and the
taste for communities with high levels of human capital are positively correlated. Surprisingly, the taste
for communities with high levels of minorities is positively correlated with the taste for high human capital
communities.
To test hypothesis 1, we use the random coefﬁcient estimates to construct willingness to pay for an
increase in rooms from 4 to 6. Let
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i denote household
i’s willingness to pay to increase the
number of rooms from 4 to 6. By equation (6), it must satisfy:
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This measure of willingness to pay for structure is regressed on household demographics. Table 5 reports
these estimates of willingness to pay for 2 more rooms for each of the three cities. Across all three cities,
richer college educated married migrants in larger households are willing to pay more for more space.
Holding all of these demographics constant, blacks are willing to pay $399 per year less in Chicago for the
extra living space. In Atlanta, all else equal, blacks are willing to pay $172 less for extra living space.8
But, all else is not equal. As shown in Table 2, Blacks have lower incomes, lower college graduate
rates and lower marriage rates. Based on the Atlanta coefﬁcient estimates, if blacks caught up to the av-
erage white for these three demographic categories their willingness to pay for rooms would signiﬁcantly
increase. Demographicdifferencesmatter asmuchas“tastedifferences”in explainingthedemandfor phys-
ical attributes across races. The differential demand for housing unit size between whites and blacks is our
strongest housing structure evidence for why black urbanization takes place. For other physical attributes
of housing we do not ﬁnd such major differences in willingness to pay between groups. Table 6 presents
our estimates for how much migrants are willing to pay to live in a house that is 35 years old versus a house
that is 10 years old. Across all three cities, migrants are willing to pay for newer housingbut the differences
in willingness to pay across demographic groups are small. For example, in Chicago a college graduate is
willing to pay $2.76 more than an identical non-college graduate to live in older housing.
Table 7 presents estimates of the household willingness to pay to own based on equation (21). Note that
the price coefﬁcient has been normalized to equal -1. In Chicago, the college educated are willing to pay
$72 more per year. An extra $10,000 in household income increases willingness to pay to own by $44 per
year. Only in Atlanta, do we reject the hypothesis that whites and blacks have equal willingness to pay to
own.9
Table8 presentsthe willingnessto paydifferentials for single detachedhousing. In Atlanta and Chicago,
blacks are willing to pay less for such housing. In Chicago, all else equal, blacks are willing to pay $410
less per year for such housing than whites. Similar to the case of rooms, married people are willing to pay
8 We choose not to present estimates of (7) since by equation (22), the dependent variables in the regressions
presented in Tables 5-7 and Tables 10-11 are equal to a constant times the dependent variable in equation (7).
9 It is important to note that with our one cross-section of data, we are estimating a static model of housing
demand. We recognize that the tenure choice decision has a dynamic component.
17more to live in single detached housing. Since blacks have lower marriage rates, this contributes to the total
white/black gap with respect to demand for physical attributes. While household income and educational
attainment sharply increase demand for detached housing in Chicago, such income effects have a much
smaller impact in Atlanta and Dallas.
5.2 Hypothesis #2: Commuting and Place of Work
Employment suburbanization has tracked residential suburbanization for the last 50 years in the United
States (Garreau 1992, Glaeser and Kahn 2001). As workers have suburbanized many jobs have followed
them to the suburbs. As jobs migrate to the suburbs, suburban residents have shorter commutes and land
intensive ﬁrms can purchase more land cheaper than in the CBD. Such “job sprawl”could increase the
black/white suburbanization gap if households do not like commuting and blacks tend to work in highly
urbanized industries.
Atlanta, Chicago and Dallas all have a signiﬁcant amount of employment located outside of their center
cities. In our migrant Atlanta sample, 59% of workers work in the suburbs and 53% of black workers work
in the suburbs. In Chicago, 70% of workers are in the suburbs and 42% of black workers work in the
suburbs. In Dallas, 62% work in the suburbs and 54% of blacks work in the suburbs.
The commuting hypothesis posits that blacks live in the city because they work in the city. We test
this hypothesis in Table 9 by estimating the demand for living in the city, as in equation (21). For each
of the three cities, we estimate two separate models. We ﬁrst estimate how much blacks are willing to
pay to live in the city holding all other migrant demographics and housing choice attributes constant. In
Atlanta and Dallas, all else equal, blacks are willing to pay $192 and $1154 dollars a year more than whites
to live in the city. To test how much of this black differential willingness to pay is driven by place of
work, we include in the speciﬁcation a dummy variable indicating whether the migrant works in the center
city. We recognize that working in the city is an endogenous regressor. Migrants may work in the city
because they found out about a job opportunity from a city neighbor. In such a job search model, living
in the city would raise your probability of working in the city. We thus instrument for whether a migrant
works in the city using the worker’s industry information (dummy variables for whether the migrant works
in manufacturing, wholesale, retail, services, construction, or for the government). These dummies will
be valid instruments if workers have invested in industry speciﬁc human capital and industries differ with
18respect to their suburbanization propensities (see Neal 1995). For example, land intensive industries such
as manufacturing tend to suburbanize.10
For each city, we present our results where we include the work in city indicator and instrument for this
variable. In all three cities, including this variable sharply reduces black willingness to pay to urbanize. In
Dallas, black willingness to pay falls from 1154 to 355 when place of work is controlled for and in Chicago
the hypothesis that the black coefﬁcient is zero cannot be rejected. It is important to note that the ﬁrst
stage IV results have an R2 of .02 for each city. Still across the three cities, we ﬁnd that black employment
urbanization helps to explain black residential urbanization.
While not directly relevant for answering our paper’s question, our structural estimates provide some
insights into migrant value of time. This is relevant for judging the plausibility of our parameter estimates.
Chicago migrants who work in the city are willing to pay $381 more per year to live in the city than
migrants who work in the suburbs. Migrants who commute by car and work and live in city have an 11
minute shorter one way commute than migrants who live in the city and work in the suburbs. This suggests
that migrants are willing to pay $4.15 to avoid an hour of commuting. Many travel cost studies assume that
people value their commute time at 50% of their hourly wage. Our Chicago estimate is roughly in line with
this assumption.
5.3 Hypothesis #3: The Demand for Peers
Each day we interact with our neighbors. Thus, their attributes affect our well being and our human capital
accumulation. Hedonic studies havemeasured the beneﬁt of having high skilled neighborsby studying land
rents in high and low skill areas (Rauch 1993, DiPasquale and Kahn 1999). Other empirical studies have
measured peer group effects by regressing outcome measures such as a person’s employment status on the
average of this outcome measure for one’s peer group (Case and Katz 1991, Crane 1991). The practical
problem of measuringwhat are social externalitiesassociatedwith peer exposurehasled to an econometrics
literature focused on the reﬂection problem (Manski 1993). An alternative to the “production function”
method for recovering the beneﬁts of peers is to measure the willingness to pay to live among them. If a
household greatly beneﬁt from living in a particular community, we should observe this household being
willing to pay a great deal to live there.
1
0 Glaeser and Kahn (2001) provide a detailed discussion of what types of industries demand to be centrally located.
19In all urban studies, researchers face the challenge of deﬁning what is the geography of the community
and what is a parsimonious set of community attributes that matter. With regard to deﬁning community,
we use the census’ PUMA deﬁnition. While we are well aware that communities can differ block by block
in this car age people come into contract with a wide variety of people who live in an area around them.
We model community attributes using the PUMA’s percent college graduates and the community’s percent
black. A community with more college graduates will have a richer variety of stores and restaurants. An
emergent property of having an active educated set of neighbors is that the local schools will be better
and crime will be lower. This community will feature an active set of role models who regularly go to
work and they will be vocal stakeholders in preserving the quality of the community. In terms of cross-
community variation, it is true that communities with more college graduateshavefewer blackresidents but
the correlations across the three cities are not extremely large. The correlation between a PUMA’s percent
black and percent college graduate in Atlanta, Chicago and Dallas is -.54, -.40, and -.54 respectively. We
are thus conﬁdent that we can disentangle the separate demands for these attributes.
Table 10 reports our structural estimates of the willingness to pay to live in a community whose percent
of adults whoare collegegraduatesincreasesfrom 10% to 35%. Acrossall three cities, the collegeeducated
are willing to pay much more to live in the high human capital areas. In Chicago, college graduates are
willing to pay $1225 more per year than non-college graduates to live in such a community. This indicates
that among migrants there is a signiﬁcant degree of sorting. High skilled individuals are sorting into high
skilled communities. Across all three cities, holding demographics constant, blacks are willing to pay less
to live in this high human capital community. In Atlanta, blacks are willing to pay $585 less and in Chicago
theyarewilling topay$1154less. Whilericherhouseholdsarewilling topaymoretoliveinhighereducated
communities, the slope is small. In Chicago, an extra $10,000 in householdincome increaseswillingness to
pay by $185 per year. Since the suburbs feature higher levels of college graduates, the evidence in Table 10
supportsthe hypothesisthat differential sorting into high skill communitiesexplainspart of the urbanization
puzzle.
Whites and blacks may have different preferences over their favorite community racial composition.
Using a hedonic 1st stage housing price regression in each decade from 1950 to 1990, Cutler, Glaeser and
Vigdor (1999) concluded that whites are willing to pay more than blacks to live in white communities.
20We study their claim using our structural approach that explicitly recovers estimates of willingness to pay.
Table 11 presents regression estimates of willingness to pay for living in a community that is 35% black
versus a community that is 10% black (holding everything else constant). The most interesting result in the
table is that across the three cities, blacks are willing to pay less than whites to live in such a community.
In Chicago, black migrants are willing to pay $684 less per year than whites to live in such a community.
Unlike Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999), we ﬁnd no evidence for the hypothesis that whites are willing to
pay more to live with other whites.
Whites are willing to pay more to live in college educated communities and these are often white com-
munities but controlling for community human capital levels, whites actually exhibit a taste for integration.
The migrant black householdswho make up our sample are willing to pay more than observationallyidenti-
cal whites to live in whiter communities. It is important to note that our sample consists of working migrant
households and this trims from the sample many minorities who reside in ghetto poverty.
6 Conclusion
Studyinghousingdemandis anaturalapplicationofrecentlydevelopedtechniquesfor ﬂexiblymodelingthe
demandfor differentiatedproducts. Wehaveadaptedtheempirical strategypresentedin Bajari andBenkard
(2002) to model housing. The three stagemodel relaxessomecommonly madeassumptionsin the literature
such as that random coefﬁcients are normally distributed and independent across housing attributes. In our
application, these assumptions appear to be inappropriate.
Our empirical application focused on the important urban question of why blacks choose to live in cities
while whites suburbanize. Based on our structural estimates, we conclude that white suburbanization is
drivenbytheirgreaterdemandforlarger singledetachedhousingunitsandtheir greaterdemandfor livingin
highhumancapitalcommunities. Blackdemandfor suburbanhousingproductswouldsigniﬁcantlyincrease
if their incomes, educational attainment and marriage rates were as high as whites. Black urbanization is
also explained by their propensity to work in center cities. All else equal, the disutility from commuting
provides an incentive to choose urban residential communities. We reject the hypothesis that white demand
for the suburbs is driven by the desire to live among other whites.
We have focused on the utility maximizing choices of migrants without investigating the social conse-
21quences of their choices. One important externality generated by suburbanization of the well to do is the
increasedisolation of the urbanminority poor. We haveshownthat highlyeducated,wealthyblackmigrants
have a high demand for suburban housing products. Wilson (1987) has argued that such selective migration
of wealthier blacks to the suburbs reduces the center city poor’s exposure to “role models” and this in turn
reduces the next generation’s educational attainment and commitment to working in the legal sector. This
dynamic process would explain why Cutler and Glaeser (1997) conclude using 1990 data that ghettos are
bad for blacks (based on teenage educational attainment and idle status) while Collins and Margo (2000)
found that blacks who lived in segregated ghettos in the 1950s did not suffer such adverse effects. The
social consequencesof privately optimal housing choices merits further research.
7 References.
[1] Ackerberg, Dan and Rysman, Mark (2002), Unobserved Product Differentiation in Discrete Choice
Models: Estimating Price Elasticities and Welfare Effects, Mimeo, UCLA and Boston College.
[2] Alonso, William (1964), Location and Land Use. Harvard University Press.
[3] Anderson, S., DePalma, A., and J. Thisse (1995), Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation,
Cambridge, MIT Press.
[4] Bajari, Patrick and C. Lanier Benkard (2002), Demand Estimation with Heterogenous Consumers and
Unobserved Product Characteristics: A Hedonic Approach, Stanford University Working Paper.
[5] Bayer, Patrick, McMillan and Kim Ruben, (2002) The Causes and Consequences of Residential Seg-
regation: An Equilibrium Analysis of Neighborhood Sorting. Working Paper, Yale University.
[6] Berry, Steven (1994), Estimating Discrete Choice Models of Product Differentiation, Rand Journal of
Economics, 25(2), 242-62.
[7] Berry, Steven; James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes (1995), Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium,
Econometrica, 63(4), 841-90.
[8] Berry, Steven; JamesLevinsohn,and Ariel Pakes.“Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles: Eval-
uating a Strategic Trade Policy”, American Economic Review 89 (3), 400-430.
[9] Bresnahan, Timothy (1987) Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry. Journal
of Industrial Economics, vol. XXXV (no. 4, June–Special Issue) 457-482.
22[10] Brown, James N and Harvey S. Rosen (1982), On the Estimation of Structural Hedonic Price Models.
Econometrica, 50(3), 765-768
[11] Case, Anne and Lawrence Katz (1991), The Company You Keep: The Effects of Family and Neigh-
borhood on Disadvantaged Youths. NBER Working Paper 3705.
[12] Cheshire, Paul and Stephen Sheppard (1998), Estimating the Demand for Housing, Land and Neigh-
bourhood Characteristics, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 60(3) 357-382.
[13] Collins, William and Robert A. Margo (2000), Residential Segregation and Socioeconomic Outcomes:
When Did Ghettos Go Bad? Economics Letters 69(2) 239-243.
[14] Costa, Dora (1998), The Evolution of Retirement. University of Chicago Press.
[15] Coulson, Edward and Eric Bond (1990), A Hedonic Approach to Residential Succession, Review of
Economics & Statistics. 72(3). 433-444.
[16] Crane, Jonathan (1991), The Epidemic Theory of Ghettos and Neighborhood Effects on Dropping Out
of High School and Teenage Childbearing, American Journal of Sociology 96(5) 1126-1159.
[17] Cutler, David., Edward Glaeser (1997), Are Ghettos Good or Bad?, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
112(3) 827-872.
[18] Cutler, David., Edward Glaeser, and Jacob Vigdor (1999), The Rise and Decline of the American
Ghetto, Journal of Political Economy. 107(3) 455-506.
[19] Di, Zhu Xio (2001,) The Role of Housing as a Component of Household Wealth. W01-6. Joint Center
for Housing Studies. Harvard University.
[20] DiPasquale, Denise and Matthew E. Kahn (1999), Measuring Neighborhood Investments: An Exami-
nation of Community Choice, Real Estate Economics 27(3) 389-424.
[21] Duca, John and Stuart Rosenthal (1994), Borrowing Constraints and Access to Owner Occupied Hous-
ing, Regional Science and Urban Ecoonomics 24(3) 301-322.
[22] Epple, Dennis(1987), HedonicPrices andImplicit Markets: Estimating Demandand SupplyFunctions
for Differentiated Products, Journal of Political Economy, 95(1), 59-80.
[23] Epple, Dennis and Holger Sieg (1999), Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions, Journal
of Political Economy, 107(4) 645-681.
[24] Fan, Jinqing and Irene Gijbels, Local Polynomial Modelling and Its Applications (Monographs on
Statistics and Applied Probability, (66), CRC Press.
23[25] Garreau, Joel. Edge City: Life on the New Frontier. New York: Anchor Books, 1992.
[26] Gaspar, Jess and Edward L. Glaeser (1998), Information Technology and the Future of Cities Journal
of Urban Economics, 43(1) 136-156.
[27] Glaeser, Edward L and Matthew E. Kahn (2001), Decentralized Employment and the Transformation
of the American City Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, vol. 0, no. 0, 1-47.
[28] Glaeser, Edward L, Matthew E. Kahn, and Jordan Rappaport (2000), Why Do the Poor Live in Cities?
NBER Working Paper W7636.
[29] Gyourko, Joesph. and Joesph Tracy (1991), The Structure of Local Public Finance and the Quality of
Life, Journal of Political Economy. 91(4), 774-806.
[30] Heckman, James (1998), Detecting Discrimination, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, 101-116.
[31] Manski, Charles (1993), Identiﬁcation of EndogenousSocial Effects: The ReﬂectionProblem, Review
of Economic Studies, 60, 531-542.
[32] Mas-Colell(1977)TheRecoverabilityofConsumerPreferencesFromMarketDemandBehavior,Econo-
metrica, 45(6), 1409-1430.
[33] McCulloch, Robert E; Nicholas G Polson, and Peter E. Rossi (2000), A Bayesian Analysis of the
Multinomial Probit Model with Fully Identiﬁed Parameters. Journal of Econometrics, 99(1), 173-193.
[34] Munnell, Alicia, G. Tootell, Lynn Browne and J. McEneaney (1996), Mortgage Lending in Boston:
Interpreting HMDA Data. American Economic Review, 86, 25-53.
[35] Neal, Derek (1995), Industry-Speciﬁc Human Capital: Evidence from Displaced Workers Journal of
Labor Economics, 13(4), 653-677.
[36] Palmquist, Raymond (1984), Estimating the Demand for the Characteristics of Housing, Review of
Economics and Statistics, 66(3), August, 394-404.
[37] Petrin,Amil (2002),Quantifying the Beneﬁts of New Products: The Case of the Minivan, Journal of
Political Economy, 110(4) 705-729.
[38] Rauch,James(1993), ProductivityGainsfrom GeographicConcentrationofHumanCapital: Evidence
from the Cities, Journal of Urban Economics, 34(3) 380-400.
[39] Rosen, Sherwin (1974), Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Compe-
tition, Journal of Political Economy 82 (January/February) 34-55.
24[40] Wilson, William Julius (1987). The Truly Disadvantaged. University of Chicago Press.
[41] Yinger, John (1986), Measuring Racial Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits. American Economic
Review, 76 881-893.
25Table 1: Demographic Means for Migrants 
Atlanta Chicago Dallas
 
Whites White Blacks Black Whites White Blacks Black Whites White Blacks Black
  Migrants   Migrants   Migrants   Migrants   Migrants   Migrants
Age   38.5639 35.2778 37.1946 34.4020 39.6639 35.4292 41.1371 36.8976 37.6311 34.1971 37.2549 33.8209
College Graduate 0.4346 0.4573 0.2320 0.2470 0.3237 0.3634 0.1935 0.2124 0.3631 0.3603 0.2071 0.2313
Household Income 55527.7000 51290.3100 36524.6400 34035.8600 54048.3200 50040.2700 40395.3800 36629.7200 48350.0500 42595.9000 31591.1400 29522.2400
Male 0.7596 0.7398 0.5808 0.5677 0.7931 0.7747 0.5974 0.5740 0.7628 0.7302 0.5783 0.5599
Household Size 2.7095 2.6115 2.8370 2.7291 3.0190 2.8301 3.1400 2.8989 2.7528 2.5751 2.8941 2.7461
Married 0.6276 0.5781 0.4515 0.4106 0.6730 0.6144 0.4724 0.4147 0.6131 0.5309 0.4246 0.3752
Migrant 0.6240 0.6777 0.5359 0.4556 0.6309 0.6645
City 0.0662 0.0667 0.2232 0.1679 0.2009 0.1990 0.5565 0.4867 0.2051 0.2162 0.4864 0.4513
Home Owner 0.6721 0.5391 0.4398 0.2958 0.6909 0.5597 0.5179 0.3590 0.5550 0.3709 0.3824 0.2102
Single Detached House 0.6943 0.5821 0.4809 0.3456 0.6065 0.4833 0.4407 0.3338 0.6369 0.4920 0.4864 0.3357
Rooms 6.1452 5.7907 5.3120 4.9404 5.8226 5.4847 5.3525 4.9975 5.3415 4.9065 4.6223 4.2849
Age of House 15.5529 12.9190 19.6377 16.9919 31.4790 28.3798 38.0910 33.6947 17.7749 15.4060 19.8946 16.8385
The raw data is the 1990 U.S Census of Population and Housing. This sample consists of all heads of households ages 18-60 who work and who commute by car to workTable 2: Summary Statistics for the Migrants Included in the Structural Estimation
Atlanta   Chicago Dallas
Black White Black White Black White
Migrants Migrants Migrants Migrants Migrants Migrants
Age   33.7750 35.3790 37.1579 35.3341 33.2857 34.5416
College Graduate 0.2333 0.4651 0.1886 0.3685 0.2239 0.3487
Household Income 35005.6100 50580.4900 36071.4900 51226.5100 28024.2700 43254.9600
Male 0.5833 0.7329 0.5175 0.7737 0.5251 0.7490
Household Size 2.6646 2.5934 2.9167 2.8595 2.8533 2.5876
Married 0.4354 0.5730 0.3991 0.6027 0.3552 0.5399
Work in City 0.4729 0.3901 0.5789 0.2748 0.4556 0.3716
Live in City 0.1500 0.0671 0.5044 0.1992 0.4479 0.2148
Community % College 0.2546 0.3283 0.1946 0.2809 0.2346 0.2702
Community % Black 0.4432 0.1334 0.4649 0.0687 0.2350 0.1069
Home Owner 0.3125 0.5283 0.3202 0.5751 0.2162 0.3779
Detached House 0.3542 0.5803 0.3158 0.4808 0.3282 0.4871
Rooms 5.0729 5.7382 4.8860 5.5248 4.2703 4.8960
Age of Unit 15.9594 13.4191 32.3114 28.6332 17.4556 14.8601
Annual Housing Expenditure  5822.2220 8030.6000 5705.1700 8817.6560 4661.2630 6584.6170
This table reports sample means for 2000 observations for each city drawn at random from the set of migrants.
 Table 3:  Descriptive OLS Regressions of Migrant Housing Choice  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Atlanta Community Community Live in Home Unit Rooms Age of Unit
% College % Black Suburbs Owner Detached    
Household Income 0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0027 0.0020 0.0172 -0.0403
College Graduate 0.0510 0.0057 -0.0327 0.0788 0.0327 0.2701 1.2412
Black  -0.0570 0.3043 -0.0910 -0.0967 -0.1236 -0.2065 1.8960
Household Size -0.0091 -0.0012 0.0162 0.0255 0.0598 0.3853 0.5388
Age -0.0020 0.0029 -0.0008 0.0122 0.0106 0.0377 0.1347
Married -0.0158 -0.0334 0.0790 0.2249 0.2874 0.6806 -3.8962
Male -0.0198 0.0032 -0.0045 0.0652 0.0777 0.0082 0.3601
Constant 0.3803 0.0728 0.9202 -0.3195 -0.2866 2.0125 10.6838
R2 0.1630 0.3357 0.0527 0.2901 0.3617 0.4317 0.0274
Chicago Community Community Live in Home Unit Rooms Age of Unit
% College % Black Suburbs Owner Detached    
Household Income 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0032 0.0020 0.0152 -0.1049
College Graduate 0.0733 0.0000 -0.0413 0.0493 0.0272 0.4533 -0.2234
Black  -0.0668 0.3870 -0.2903 -0.1721 -0.0813 -0.2755 1.6540
Household Size -0.0099 0.0079 -0.0184 0.0230 0.0493 0.3562 1.6582
Age -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0011 0.0101 0.0074 0.0243 -0.0464
Married -0.0124 -0.0222 0.0938 0.2207 0.2805 0.7002 -4.2258
Male -0.0191 -0.0078 -0.0199 -0.0005 0.0298 -0.1011 1.8590
Constant 0.2752 0.0922 0.7577 -0.1621 -0.2249 2.3581 32.0950
R2 0.2063 0.3934 0.0659 0.2426 0.2440 0.3802 0.0405
Dallas Community Community Live in Home Unit Rooms Age of Unit
% College % Black Suburbs Owner Detached    
Household Income 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0036 0.0030 0.0186 -0.0554
College Graduate 0.0239 -0.0069 -0.0332 0.0913 0.0340 0.5427 -2.6528
Black  -0.0282 0.1156 -0.2013 -0.0483 -0.0655 -0.2073 1.1757
Household Size -0.0076 0.0118 -0.0153 0.0170 0.0690 0.2442 1.4448
Age -0.0006 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0085 0.0099 0.0404 0.0936
Married -0.0035 -0.0374 0.1623 0.2228 0.2064 0.8001 -2.3924
Male -0.0126 0.0179 -0.0132 -0.0033 0.0467 -0.2949 2.0705
Constant 0.2943 0.0756 0.7561 -0.2655 -0.3242 1.6652 10.9509
R2 0.0858 0.1394 0.0607 0.2684 0.3172 0.4161 0.0481
This table reports 21 reduced form OLS regressions; seven for each city.  The dependent variables "Live in 
Suburbs", "Home Owner, and "Unit Detached" are dummy variables.  In each regression, housing consumption
measures are fitted as a function of personal attributes. The omitted category is a white, non-college graduate
who is female and not married. Household Income is measured in 1,000s of 1989 $.
There are 2000 observations in each regression.
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 Table 4:  Correlation Matrix of Marginal Utilities by Metropolitan Area  
Atlanta
Community 
Rooms Age of Unit % BA
Age of Unit 0.0749
Community % BA 0.1347 -0.0475
Community % Black 0.0219 0.2264 0.4577
Chicago
Community 
Rooms Age of Unit % BA
Age of Unit 0.1231  
Community % BA 0.4126 0.1783  
Community % Black 0.1259 0.1414 0.3687
Dallas
Community 
Rooms Age of Unit % BA
Age of Unit 0.0414
Community % BA 0.2501 0.1458
Community % Black 0.1476 0.2561 0.4633Table 5:  Estimates of The Willingness to Pay for Rooms 
Atlanta Chicago Dallas
 
Age 21.9402 19.4257 22.8256
(2.3616) (2.7855) (2.0161)
College Graduate 184.7462 378.0459 316.2760
(41.5490) (55.0933) (40.9990)
Black -172.3309 -398.7179 -140.3617
(44.1881) (67.9734) (55.7413)
Household Income 10.2370 12.4079 11.0030
(0.8263) (1.0465) (0.6090)
Household Size 209.7445 217.7264 132.4001
(17.9231) (28.7072) (14.8875)
Male 30.3560 -53.2453 -149.3462
(47.5370) (59.4864) (47.9940)
Married 411.3082 576.3986 467.0055
(54.0722) (69.0660) (50.3100)
Constant 688.9144 748.4642 659.6018
(88.5487) (110.2144) (80.1425)
R2 0.4578 0.4106 0.4323
Observations 2000 2000 2000
 
Each column of the table presents a separate OLS regression.
The dependent variable is a migrant's willingness to pay per year for an increase from 4 to 6
rooms in a housing unit, holding all other housing product attributes constant.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The omitted category is a white, non-college graduate who is female and not married.
Household Income is measured in 1,000s of 1989 $.
 Table 6:  Estimates of The Willingness to Pay for an Older Housing Unit  
Atlanta Chicago Dallas
 
Age -4.2261 0.1381 -3.9095
(1.1981) (1.8801) (1.3866)
College Graduate -10.6141 2.7577 111.8226
(21.9891) (39.1612) (28.1964)
Black -46.9915 62.5131 -38.9609
(23.4239) (47.4732) (38.3352)
Household Income 1.7531 3.3548 2.2824
(0.3908) (0.5506) (0.4188)
Household Size -29.4079 -71.2458 -58.1456
(8.9125) (12.5904) (10.2387)
Male -9.6398 -59.0414 -78.6016
(27.3633) (44.1225) (33.0071)
Married 115.1276 90.0929 79.6203
(29.1504) (44.1556) (34.5999)
Constant -453.4905 -1175.1670 -472.3534
(48.7979) (79.9419) (55.1167)
R2 0.0337 0.0376 0.0531
Observations 2000 2000 2000
 
Each column of the table presents a separate OLS regression.
The dependent variable is a migrant's willingness to pay per year for an increase from 10 to 35
years in the age of a housing unit, holding all other housing product attributes constant.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The omitted category is a white, non-college graduate who is female and not married.
Household Income is measured in 1,000s of 1989 $.Table 7: Estimates of the Demand for Owning 
Atlanta Chicago Dallas
 
Age 5.7628 10.8808 0.9960
(0.5457) (1.4349) (0.1411)
College Graduate 53.5150 72.3841 13.0556
(9.8024) (28.3355) (2.8978)
Black -38.1048 -48.5070 5.2907
(10.6864) (39.3679) (4.0455)
Household Income 1.5823 4.4116 0.3716
(0.1747) (0.5000) (0.0450)
Household Size 18.6377 50.4153 4.8466
(4.1044) (8.8029) (1.0871)
Male 25.6344 12.8634 -2.1273
(11.0205) (31.8090) (3.5123)
Married 64.2837 165.0626 8.5168
(11.8269) (30.9482) (3.6587)
Price of Ownership -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000
 
Constant -315.7914 -301.8911 52.2557
(22.9383) (62.5935) (6.1095)
observations 2000 2000 2000
 
Each column of the table presents a separate estimate of equation (21).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The omitted category is a white, non-college graduate who is female, and not married.
Household Income is measured in 1,000s of 1989 $.Table 8:  Estimates of the Demand for Single Detached Housing
Atlanta Chicago Dallas
 
Age -0.0211 16.1145 0.1754
(0.4314) (2.5122) (0.2191)
College Graduate -0.6411 82.1002 -6.5952
(7.3269) (49.7589) (4.4498)
Black -36.5337 -409.6949 -5.5963
(7.2683) (76.1423) (5.7880)
Household Income 0.3890 5.9420 0.0345
(0.1682) (0.7282) (0.0850)
Household Size 3.7795 75.1032 -0.2434
(2.9635) (15.7585) (1.3193)
Male -6.0654 31.6040 3.2634
(8.0832) (61.4414) (5.0320)
Married 40.8022 598.1848 10.2411
(9.3722) (57.0570) (4.7934)
Price of Single Detached Unit  -1.0000  -1.0000  -1.0000
Constant 236.9936 -815.7973 -23.6736
(25.4464) (127.1599) (9.8171)
Observations 2000 2000 2000
 
Each column of the table presents a separate estimate of equation (21).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The omitted category is a white, non-college graduate who is female, and not married.
Household Income is measured in 1,000s of 1989 $.Table 9: Estimates of The Demand for Living in the Center City 
Atlanta Chicago Dallas  
 MLE  IV          MLE        IV  MLE    IV 
Work in City 1107.7020 381.0468 2284.1580
(560.0689) (160.7365) (610.1467)
Age 6.2919 7.81 3.5841 2.5744 3.3249 -6.0978
(2.8533) (3.2849) (0.9379) (1.2506) (7.2669) (4.0110)
College Graduate 192.7268 184.0818 72.4209 59.5484 253.1178 74.6930
(53.1446) (64.2010) (18.5754) (22.9696) (145.8183) (72.9149)
Black 192.0734 127.0259 44.9930 -41.9344 1154.3430 355.3576
(56.1501) (81.7120) (23.6132) (47.8523) (180.1841) (103.0735)
Household Income 4.2080 3.5120 1.5404 1.0469 -2.0029 -1.7019
(0.7983) (1.0986) (0.2468) (0.3607) (2.3551) (1.1744)
Household Size -45.0881 -10.8730 28.4383 30.0853 109.7375 67.3517
(24.4813) (33.4863) (5.2666) (5.9734) (51.6970) (25.4514)
Male 14.3055 111.4717 7.8602 -5.3234 70.9471 110.5087
(53.1691) (78.5761) (20.5317) (24.9219) (160.4220) (81.6356)
Married -179.3233 -294.9678 36.3894 27.7950 -1059.3110 -452.7784
(67.2694) (85.4042) (20.2460) (23.2029) (178.2471) (88.6307)
Price of Living in the City -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000
Constant 517.8559 -135.9546 606.8317 538.8738 -794.6178 -654.2031
(211.7071) (397.3694) (51.0477) (92.3438) (903.1547) (450.8096)
Observations 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
 
Each column of the table presents a separate estimate of equation (21).
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
IV indicates that the model was estimated using an instrumental variable strategy.
The dummy variable "Work in City" equals one if a migrants works in the city. This variable is instrumented for
using dummy variables for what industry the migrant works in. 
The omitted category is a white, non-college graduate who is female, not married and works in the suburbs.
Household Income is measured in 1,000s of 1989 $.Table 10:  Estimates of The Willingness to Pay to Live in a Highly Educated Community 
Atlanta Chicago Dallas
 
Age -15.6400 6.3942 -1.5148
(3.3339) (4.9032) (1.4405)
College Graduate 523.1925 1225.3590 178.6172
(59.8207) (106.3816) (29.2932)
Black -585.4029 -1154.4310 -221.9220
(66.0349) (130.7574) (39.8264)
Household Income 9.4491 18.5349 3.8869
(0.9991) (1.7275) (0.4351)
Household Size -68.9991 -74.1159 -38.6235
(24.6644) (30.2752) (10.6369)
Male -182.6332 -264.7713 -87.6784
(69.6553) (114.0511) (34.2910)
Married -91.6378 124.8641 36.2052
(76.5356) (108.5081) (35.9458)
Constant 3350.2190 3284.0540 1857.4340
(131.1406) (206.5099) (57.2607)
R2 0.1745 0.2595 0.1102
Observations 2000 2000 2000
 
Each column of the table presents a separate OLS regression.
The dependent variable is a migrant's willingness to pay per year for an increase from 10% to 35%
of community members who are college graduates, holding all other housing product attributes constant.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The omitted category is a white, non-college graduate who is female and not married.
Household Income is measured in 1,000s of 1989 $.Table 11:  Estimates of The Willingness to Pay for Living in a Black Community
Atlanta Chicago Dallas
 
Age -5.6254 0.8965 -1.8859
(0.8075) (0.7535) (0.5645)
College Graduate -20.0670 6.0702 9.1012
(14.4892) (13.8707) (11.4790)
Black -433.7638 -683.5248 -214.2852
(15.9943) (41.4719) (15.6066)
Household Income 0.5206 0.2751 0.7133
(0.2420) (0.1768) (0.1705)
Household Size -2.8986 -20.0737 -23.6381
(5.9740) (5.4234) (4.1682)
Male -11.8165 4.3038 -31.7136
(16.8712) (19.0165) (13.4374)
Married 28.8122 26.6823 65.5898
(18.5377) (18.2222) (14.0859)
Constant 7.8506 -164.0204 -115.4729
(31.7635) (29.7271) (22.4384)
R2 0.2972 0.3646 0.1343
Observations 2000 2000 2000
 
Each column of the table presents a separate OLS regression.
The dependent variable is a migrant's willingness to pay per year for an increase from 10% to 35%
of community members who are black, holding all other housing product attributes constant.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The omitted category is a white, non-college graduate who is female and not married.
Household Income is measured in 1,000s of 1989 $.